The news out of New York today is that:

A group led by Tishman Speyer Properties has decided to give up the sprawling Peter Cooper Village and Stuyvesant Town apartment complex in Manhattan to its creditors in the collapse of one of the most high-profile deals of the real-estate boom.

The decision comes after the venture between Tishman and BlackRock Inc. defaulted on the $4.4 billion debt used to help finance the deal. The venture acquired the 56-building, 11,000-unit property for $5.4 billion in 2006—the most ever paid for a single residential property in the U.S. The venture had been struggling for months to restructure the debt but capitulated facing a massive debt load and a weak New York City economy that has undercut rents and demand for high-priced apartments.

via Tishman Venture Gives Up Stuyvesant Project – WSJ.com.

Unfortunately, this deal was done at the height of the market. The owners were expecting to be able to raise rents on many of the units to market rates. A lawsuit by tenants halted the owners’ plans and eventually the tenants won.

The interest reserve ran out earlier this year and the owners decided to turn the keys over to the lenders.

Now the property is whispered to be worth only $1.8 Billion, less than half the purchase price and less than half the $4.4 Billion debt used to finance the project. Many of the lenders are going to lose money on this project as well as the loss to the equity investors.

This project should serve as a monument to commercial underwriters to be careful when using forecasted rental income to determine value.

(Photo: stuyvesant town by dandeluca)

GlobeSt.com is reporting that Behringer Harvard Buys 277-Unit Complex for $38M in Santa Rosa, CA.

Behringer Harvard Multifamily REIT I has acquired the 277-unit Acacia on Santa Rosa Creek apartments in the third apartment property purchase in California by the Dallas-based apartment REIT in recent weeks.

The buyers believe that the rental demand for Sonoma County is still strong and warrants an acquisition price.

East Palo Alto, in the San Francisco Bay Area, is suffering due to the default of the city’s largest landlord. The WSJ details the plight in Firm Takes Heat Over East Palo Alto Crime.

A wave of robberies and burglaries is hitting East Palo Alto, threatening to reverse the city’s recent period of stabilization. One reason behind the crime surge is the financial troubles of real-estate firm Page Mill, say locals, law enforcement and other officials of the town.

Page Mill Properties LLC, which began snapping up local apartments in 2006, became the city’s biggest rental-unit landlord and attempted to transform the town by redeveloping properties into higher-end condominiums.

Earlier this week I wrote about San Francisco’s Apartment Woes caused by the default of the Lembi family.

In both of these scenarios, inexpensive CMBS debt allowed the investor to buy property at unrealistic prices. “A rising tide floats all boats.” The acquisitions made sense so long as the price of real estate was rising and cheap debt was available.

However, once real estate values began to fall, financing dried up, and vacancy began to rise these over-leveraged investments don’t make sense and don’t cash flow. Lax underwriting by the CMBS issuers and unrealistic assumptions by borrowers are damaging the cities where investments were made.

Hopefully, the commercial real estate industry will learn from our mistakes and excess before this cycle is repeated.

San Francisco Magazine has an article detailing the rise and now fall of the Lembi family’s real estate empire in San Francisco. It is a long but interesting read.

The abundance of low cost money from Wall Street allowed the Lembis to acquire properties at an unbelievable rate. Now much of the portfolio is in default.

Walter Lembi, on the other hand, was willing to go all in.

It’s not clear how and when the Lembis and Citi­Apartments started taking advantage of this wild new market, but by 2005, they were in the thick of their record expansion. Like Frank at the beginning of his career, Walter put very little of the Lembis’ own money into their real-estate purchases. Most of the financing was in the form of short-term, interest-only loans. Sometimes, the family financed more than 100 percent of the purchase price covering everything from closing costs to interest payments to the cost of future renovations—using buildings they already owned as collateral.

…

One effect of buying so much real estate in a neighborhood: “The Lembis were setting their own comps,” says David Gruber, whose family owns more than a dozen apartment buildings and who serves as president of San Francisco’s rent board. He is referring to the comparable prices for buildings sold recently in the surrounding area—the basis on which buyers, sellers, and agents set the price for other properties. Every time the Lembis paid top price for a building, they provided a precedent for the next sale, driving up the paper value of all their holdings. When it came time to refinance or take cash out of a building, they could use these higher values to get bigger loans.

The loans on the Lembis’ new purchases were then bundled into CDOs assembled by leading investment banks, such as J.P. Morgan. A July 2007 CDO, worth $5 billion, included some Holiday Inn Express hotels in Ohio and North Carolina, as well as the Health Net headquarters in Connecticut. The Lembi piece of this was loan number 11, the Lembi Portfolio, a $90 million loan for 662 apartments.

(HT: Square Feet)

WSJ.com is reporting that GE recently took ownership of a an apartment portfolio in Alabama in Risky GE Apartment Loan:

General Electric’s massive real-estate operation likes to brag about how its lending business is among the most conservative around. That isn’t the case in at least one deal.

GE Real Estate, a unit of GE Finance, foreclosed Jan. 6 on a portfolio of 2,284 apartments in Alabama. Brooklyn, N.Y.-based Collins Group LLC with backing from New Jersey-based Lightstone Group bought the apartments in late 2006 for $155 million. GE lent Collins $148 million in a two-year bridge loan, according to several people familiar with the matter. That would put the original loan-to-value ratio at 95%, not very conservative.

As this deal demonstrates, the purchase price and rent assumptions made by the borrower were not feasible to support the debt load on the property.

This is an example of some of the wild deals that were done in 2006 and 2007. Many smart investors are going to sit on the sidelines until these deals are cleared out of the market.